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Is State Fiscal Policy Asymmetric
Over the Business Cycle?
By Bent E. Sorensen and Oved Yosha
A
number of stabilizers are thought to mute the business cycle.
One key stabilizer is federal fiscal policy. The federal budget sur-
plus tends to rise during economic booms and fall in downturns,
helping to stabilize consumers’ disposable income and thereby mitigate
economic fluctuations. During booms, for example, the budget surplus
typically rises because tax revenues rise more than expenditures.
Another stabilizer that has traditionally received less attention is
state fiscal policy. Like the federal budget surplus, state government sur-
pluses tend to rise during economic expansions and decline during
downturns. For instance, Nebraska’s budget surplus rose from $91 per
capita in the recession year 1990 to $326 (in 1990 prices) per capita in
1998, when the economy was booming. Moreover, like the federal
budget, state budgets represent large shares of the economy. For exam-
ple, in 1998 state government expenditure was 10 percent of gross state
product in Kansas, and 9 percent in Missouri.
The stabilizing influence of state fiscal policy, however, may differ
across business cycle expansions and downturns—making state fiscal
policy asymmetric. For example, state budgets could be more effective at
mitigating economic slumps than at muting booms if taxes fall more
Bent E. Sorensen, formerly a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, is a
professor of economics at SUNY–Binghamton. Oved Yosha is a senior lecturer at the Berglas
School of Economics, Tel Aviv University and a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. Mingwong Hui, a research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.
This article is on the bank’s web site at www.kc.frb.org.
43
Sorensen.qxd  10/2/01  11:25 AM  Page 4344 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
sharply during a slump than they rise in an expansion of equal magni-
tude. Asymmetry in fiscal policy could be caused by a number of fac-
tors, such as balanced budget rules, which are constitutionally imposed
restrictions on a state government’s ability to incur debt.
This article examines the business cycle behavior of state fiscal pol-
icy to determine whether policy is asymmetric and, if so, to identify the
causes. The first section of the article reviews the general business cycle
behavior of state budgets. The second section discusses some theoretical
explanations of asymmetry and then examines whether the fiscal poli-
cies of U.S. states are asymmetric. The third section explores whether
stringent balanced budget rules are associated with stronger asymmetry
in state fiscal policy. The article concludes that state revenue and expen-
diture display significant asymmetry over the business cycle, with nearly
offsetting effects on the budget surplus. As a result, state fiscal policy
tends to mute economic booms to roughly the same degree it mitigates
slowdowns. The asymmetries in revenue and expenditure appear to be
associated with balanced budget rules, although their fundamental
causes cannot be clearly identified.
I. EVIDENCE OF GENERALLY COUNTERCYCLICAL
STATE FISCAL POLICY 
State government budget surpluses generally follow the ups and
downs of the business cycle, typically rising during economic expansions
and falling in recessions. This procyclical behavior of budget surpluses
helps stabilize consumers’ disposable income and thereby mitigates eco-
nomic fluctuations.1 As a result, when budget surpluses are procyclical,
fiscal policy is usually referred to as countercyclical.
This section documents the general countercyclicality of state fiscal
policy. During economic expansions, government tax revenue increases
more than spending, causing the budget surplus to grow. Because this
section’s analysis abstracts from the potential for asymmetry in fiscal
policy, economic downturns are presumed to lead to identical, reversed
movements in revenue, expenditure, and the surplus.
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Data description
In the state-level data used in this article, government spending
and revenue are defined as the total outlays and receipts, respectively, of
state governments. These definitions differ somewhat from “govern-
ment purchases” in the national income and product accounts of the
United States. The key difference lies in the treatment of transfer pay-
ments. In the national data economists are most familiar with, transfer
payments are not counted as spending (government consumption and
investment expenditures), and they are netted out of tax revenues. In
state-level data, however, transfer payments are simply counted as
expenditures. More specifically, the state expenditure data include gov-
ernment consumption, investment, and transfer payments to individu-
als and local governments. The state revenue data include all receipts of
state governments.2
The data set used throughout the article spans the 48 continental
states from 1963 to 1998. The set of states is limited to those within the
continental United States because Alaska has an extremely high
dependence on oil revenue and Hawaii has a highly unusual fiscal struc-
ture. Most previous analyses of state fiscal policy have also excluded
these states. The time period 1963–98 is the longest over which annual
data are available.
Methodology for gauging cyclical behavior of fiscal policy
With revenue and expenditure defined in this way, the general cyclical
behavior of state fiscal policy is gauged by regressing the annual changes in
a state government’s revenue and expenditure on changes in the state’s
gross state product (GSP). The behavior of the budget surplus can then be
inferred from the estimated responses of revenue and expenditure.
The regressions take two simple forms:
(1)
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In equations (1) and (2), Drevenueit and Dexpenditureit are the change
in state i’s revenue and expenditure, respectively, from fiscal year t-1 to
fiscal year t.3 Dgspit is the change in state i’s GSP from calendar year t-1
to year t; Dgspit-1 is the change in GSP from year t-2 to t-1; and so on.
Revenue, expenditure, and GSP are measured in per capita terms to
abstract from the possible effects of population changes.4
The b coefficients capture, in dollar terms, the average responses—
across state governments and over time—of revenue and expenditure to
changes in GSP . The coefficient bR0, for example, measures the average
response of state revenue to a current-year increase in GSP; a positive
value indicates a procyclical response of revenue. Similarly, bR1 measures
the response to an increase in GSP last year. The coefficients from equa-
tion (2) provide corresponding results for expenditure. The units are
chosen so that the b coefficients measure the response of revenue and
expenditure to a $100 increase in GSP . The a coefficients simply repre-
sent the constant term that usually appears in a regression. The con-
stant term is allowed to differ across states in order to capture the
average increases over time in each state’s revenue and expenditure.
This approach ensures that differences across states in the average rate
of increase do not affect the estimates of the business cycle patterns in
fiscal policy.
Estimates of the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy
The regression estimates indicate state fiscal policy is generally coun-
tercyclical. Revenue rises within the year in response to an increase in GSP ,
while expenditure increases more sluggishly, with the result that the
budget surplus rises when GSP does (Table 1). More specifically, revenue
initially increases $4.7 in response to a $100 increase in GSP and then
stays roughly constant in the following years (the slight subsequent
changes are not statistically significant). Expenditure increases only $1.1
in the initial year, declines in the next year, then rises slowly but steadily
until expenditure catches up with the increase in revenue.5 As a result, the
budget surplus is on the order of $3–5 for about three years, after which
the surplus declines to about $1 as expenditure rises.6 The procyclicality
in the budget surplus means that fiscal policy is countercyclical.
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have also found state or local budget surpluses to be procyclical. For
example, for the period 1971–90, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994)
show that, as GSP growth rises, the budget surpluses of state and local
governments (combined) rise more than proportionately, suggesting
that fiscal policy stabilizes aggregate demand and income.7 For a sample
of U.S. local governments, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1989) find
that changes in revenue typically precede changes in expenditure,
implying procyclical budget surpluses.8
II. IS STATE FISCAL POLICY ASYMMETRIC?
State fiscal policy is generally countercyclical. However, several fac-
tors could lead to asymmetry in policy—so that fiscal policy responds in
varying degrees to expansions and recessions of equal magnitudes. In
particular, revenue, expenditure, and the budget surplus may respond
more or less sharply to increases in GSP than to decreases. This section
reviews the potential sources of business cycle asymmetry, describes the
methodology used to detect asymmetry, and then presents evidence of
significant asymmetry in state fiscal policy.
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Table 1
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO A RISE IN GSP
Years since rise in output
01234 5
Dollar response to a $100 rise in GSP
Revenue 4.7 5.1 4.8 3.6 4.5 5.0
(14.3) (13.4) (8.6) (5.8) (6.4) (6.4)
Expenditure 1.1 -.7 1.5 2.6 3.4 3.9
(3.5) (1.9) (3.1) (4.6) (5.5) (5.6)
Surplus 3.6 5.8 3.3 1.0 1.1 1.1
Notes: The first two rows are obtained from the regressions in equations (1) and (2) as follows. Con-
sider the first row. Column 0 displays bR0, which is the response of revenue to a current year $100
rise in GSP; column 1 displays bR0+bR1, which is the cumulative response of revenue to a one year
lagged $100 rise in GSP; and so forth. The displayed numbers are, therefore, best interpreted as rep-
resenting the response of the budget components to a $100 permanent rise in GSP . The second row is
interpreted in an analogous manner. The third row is obtained by subtracting the second from the
first row. Absolute values of t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Sources: DRI, BEA, and authors’ calculations
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Potential causes of asymmetric fiscal policy
Asymmetry in fiscal policy may arise for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing credit market constraints, balanced budget rules, lack of budget dis-
cipline in upturns, and incumbent political parties trying to influence
voting patterns or force the hand of future governments.
First, governments may find it hard to borrow in credit markets
during recessions. In general, the creditworthiness of governments
declines during recessions. As a result, U.S. state governments may face
significantly higher interest rates during recessions.9 The difficulty in
borrowing could limit spending during economic downturns, creating
asymmetry in the responses of government spending. Gavin and Per-
rotti suggest credit market problems as an explanation of their finding
that fiscal policy in Latin America is highly asymmetric.
A second potential source of borrowing constraints and asymmetry
in fiscal policy is balanced budget rules, which are imposed by state con-
stitutions rather than by credit markets. Balanced budget rules limit the
ability of state governments to incur debt and therefore may prevent
governments from borrowing in recessions. Virtually all states have such
rules.10 For example, Kansas recently cut planned spending to meet bal-
anced budget requirements (The [Kansas] Governor’s Budget Report
for Fiscal Year 2001). If balanced budget rules limit government bor-
rowing, states’ fiscal response in economic downturns will be con-
strained by the amount of surplus accumulated during expansions and,
hence, the response will be weaker for governments which have not
accumulated enough surpluses in upturns. Thus, balanced budget rules
may limit the flexibility of governments (Alesina and Bayoumi). Admit-
tedly, however, balanced budget rules may benefit states in other impor-
tant dimensions outside the scope of this article.
A third source of asymmetry in fiscal policy could be so-called “vorac-
ity” effects. In the theoretical model developed by Tornell and Lane, influ-
ential political groups engage in wasteful pork barrel spending that favors
their constituencies. Governments are then unable to accumulate sur-
pluses, or reluctant for fear the surpluses will be spent by “voracious”
pressure groups, and do not accumulate surpluses in rainy day funds dur-
ing upswings to help maintain spending during recessions.11
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So-called “political economy” models identify a fourth, related
source of asymmetry. In the theoretical model of Persson, Persson, and
Svensson, a fiscally conservative government accumulates debt (refrain-
ing from building up rainy day funds) in order to make it harder for
successor governments to increase spending. If states face credit con-
straints during recessions, the shortage of rainy day funds leads to asym-
metric fiscal policy.12 Some sentiments expressed by state policymakers
appear consistent with such models. For example, the Kansas Treasurer,
commenting on the 2001 tight budgets in Kansas, said that many peo-
ple like to blame tax cuts for the budget problems but “if taxes had not
been cut, the legislature would have spent the money and the state
would still have been saddled with budget problems” (Dvorak).
Political “sacred cows” are a fifth potential source of asymmetry in
fiscal policy. Cutting state spending on popular programs such as Medic-
aid is hard to do, especially during recessions, when these programs may
be most needed. Politicians who expand such programs during upswings
may not fully recognize their irreversible nature or, on the contrary, may
use this inherent irreversibility as yet another way of tying the hands of
successor governments. This intuition is closely related to models of the
“political business cycle” in which incumbent politicians have an incen-
tive to increase spending before elections. If that form of electioneering is
more attractive in upswings than in downturns, it may lead to asymme-
try in fiscal policy. Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha find evidence of such politi-
cal business cycle asymmetry in the fiscal policy of U.S. state and local
governments during the period 1978–94.13
Various other factors could also lead to asymmetry in fiscal policy.
For example, state governments may prefer to limit taxation in upturns
but may have a strong desire to mitigate recessions. In this case, state
fiscal policy might respond more aggressively to recessions than expan-
sions. Alternatively, even if borrowing is not constrained by forces such
as balanced budget rules, governments may respond less forcefully to
downturns than to upturns because deficit spending is perceived as a
political embarrassment. More generally, political attitudes may lead to
asymmetry in state fiscal policy.
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Methodology for measuring asymmetry in fiscal policy
Whether asymmetry exists in state fiscal policy can be gauged with
regressions of annual changes in a state’s revenue and expenditure on
changes in its GSP , with upturns in GSP distinguished from downturns.
The behavior of the budget surplus during upturns and downturns can then
be calculated from the estimated responses of revenue and expenditure.
The regressions take the forms
(3)
(4)
In equations (3) and (4), the variables Dgspit
+ and Dgspit - represent
measures of, respectively, upturns and downturns in state i’s economy.
For each state, an upturn is defined as an above-average change in its
GSP . A downturn is defined as a below-average change in a state’s GSP;
a downturn may correspond to below-trend growth or an outright
decline in GSP . More specifically, Dgspit
+equals Dgspit(the change in state
i’s GSP from year t-1 to year t) if Dgspitis above its average over time for
state i; otherwise Dgspit
+ is zero. Similarly, Dgspit -equals Dgspit if the latter
is below its average over time for state i; otherwise Dgspit - is zero. The
b
+coefficients measure the dollar response of the left-hand side variable
in response to a $100 increase in GSP in years with an above-average
rise in GSP , while the b- coefficients measure the dollar response of the
left-hand side variable to a $100 decline in GSP (where “decline” is
defined relative to the average change in GSP).
Estimates of the asymmetry in fiscal policy
The regression estimates indicate significant asymmetries in the
business cycle behavior of both revenue and expenditure, but only weak
asymmetry in the movements of the budget surplus. Revenue reacts
within the first year to upturns in the economy, increasing by $4 in
response to a $100 increase in GSP , and then slowly declines to almost
its initial level (Table 2). In contrast, expenditure does not rise and even
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declines in the second year after an upswing, perhaps due to a reduction
in transfer payments. With revenue rising relative to expenditure, the
budget surplus increases for three years following the initial rise in GSP .
These findings are very different from Gavin and Perrotti’s results for
Latin America, indicating U.S. state governments do not scramble to
spend surpluses as predicted by the Tornell and Lane voracity model.
Economic downturns produce very different patterns in government
revenue and expenditure, although not the budget surplus. In Table 3,
the estimated regression coefficients are reported such that the negative
values represent the dollar decline in revenue, expenditure, or the surplus
in response to a $100 decline in GSP during downturns.14 Not surpris-
ingly, revenue declines within the year in response to a decline in GSP ,
probably because the legislative difficulty of changing tax rates makes
them largely fixed in the short run. More interestingly, revenue keeps
falling for many years after the initial decline in state income. Expendi-
ture also reacts within the year to a decline in output, but less strongly
than revenue. As a result, the budget surplus drops within the year.
However, the deterioration in the surplus lasts only two to three years.
Table 2
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO A
CHANGE IN GSP DURING UPTURNS
Years since rise in output
01234 5
Dollar response to a $100 rise in GSP
Revenue 4.0 3.5 3.5 2.1 1.3 .9
(8.4) (5.8) (4.7) (2.3) (1.3) (.8)
Expenditure .3 -1.7 -.1 1.9 1.2 1.5
(.7) (3.0) (.2) (2.3) (1.3) (1.4)
Surplus 3.7 5.2 3.6 .2 .1 -.6
Notes: The first two rows in each panel are obtained from the regressions in equations (3) and (4) as
follows. Consider the first row. Column 0 displays b
+
R0, which is the response of the revenue to a cur-





which is the cumulative response of revenue to a one year lagged $100 rise in GSP; and so forth. The
displayed numbers are, therefore, best interpreted as representing the response of the budget compo-
nents to a $100 permanent rise in GSP . The second row is interpreted in an analogous manner. The
third row is obtained by subtracting the second from the first row. Absolute values of t-statistics
appear in parentheses.
Sources: DRI, BEA, and authors’ calculations
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Thus, the reduction in the surplus following a slowing of the economy is
similar in magnitude to the pickup in the surplus that typically follows
an increase in GSP growth. The changes in revenue, expenditure, and
the surplus following economic downturns are consistent with state gov-
ernments cutting budgets in response to “budget crises.”
Overall, state fiscal policy displays significant asymmetry. Revenue
and expenditure each behave asymetrically, responding to economic
upturns and downturns by very different degrees. However, the budget
surplus displays only weak asymmetry—just modest differences in the
responsiveness of the surplus to upturns and downturns in the economy.
One simple interpretation of the behavior of state governments is that,
during upturns, tax rates are slowly lowered, so that revenue initially rises
with GSP but then gradually declines to its baseline level. During down-
turns, tax rates are held roughly constant. Thus, revenue follows GSP in
the initial year of the economic slowdown and remains low in subsequent
years. States appear to change expenditure little during upturns but cut
spending as revenue falls during downturns. These results are broadly
Table 3
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO A CHANGE
IN GSP DURING DOWNTURNS
Years since decline in output
01234 5
Dollar response to a $100 decline in GSP
Revenue -5.5 -7.1 -5.6 -4.5 -7.9 -9.3
(9.3) (9.1) (5.7) (4.3) (7.0) (7.7)
Expenditure -2.1 -.9 -3.5 -3.5 -6.0 -6.6
(3.7) (1.2) (3.9) (3.5) (5.5) (5.7)
Surplus -3.4 -6.2 -2.1 -1.0 -1.9 -2.7
Notes: The first two rows in each panel are obtained from the regressions in equations (3) and (4) as
follows. The displayed numbers are the negative of the coefficients. Consider the first row. Column 0
displays -b
–
R0, which is the response of the revenue to a current year $100 decline in GSP (in years




R1), which is the cumulative response
of revenue to a one year lagged $100 decline in GSP; and so forth. The displayed numbers are,
therefore, best interpreted as representing the response of the budget components to a $100 perma-
nent decline in GSP . The second row is interpreted in an analogous manner. The third row is obtained
by subtracting the second from the first row. Absolute values of t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Sources: DRI, BEA, and authors’ calculations
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consistent with Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen’s finding that, for local
governments, revenue leads expenditure in time. The evidence in this arti-
cle, however, indicates this effect occurs only in downturns.15
III. ARE BALANCED BUDGET RULES A SOURCE
OF ASYMMETRY?
As shown in the last section, the evidence on asymmetries in the
business cycle behavior of state government revenue and expenditure
rules out some potential explanations, such as the voracity effect of Tor-
nell and Lane. This section examines another potential explanation for
these asymmetries: balanced budget rules. Some observers might view
such rules as the most likely source of asymmetry. However, asymmetry
in fiscal policy could be caused by other factors that are somehow
related to balanced budget rules. In particular, states that have rela-
tively tight balanced budget rules tend to be fiscally and politically con-
servative. The asymmetry in fiscal policy could then truly be due to
conservatism. This section also examines whether the conservatism of
state voters is associated with asymmetry in fiscal policy.
This analysis examines whether there is an association between
asymmetry in fiscal policy and balanced budget rules and, in turn, con-
servatism. No attempt is made to judge the merits of stringent versus
less stringent rules or conservative versus liberal government. Such eval-
uations are beyond the scope of this article.
Fiscal policy asymmetry and the stringency of balanced budget rules
To examine the relationship between asymmetry and balanced
budget rules, the states are classified in two groups—states with tight
balanced budget rules and states with less stringent or no balanced
budget rules. The states are classified using an index developed by the
National Association of State Budget Officers. The NASBO index ranks
states according to the stringency of their balanced budget rules. The
index ranges from 0 in Vermont—the only state with no balanced
budget constraints—to 10 in the states with the tightest rules. Col-
orado and Missouri, for example, have an index of 10. The “tight bal-
anced budget rules” group consists of the 35 states with an index of 8 or
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higher and the “less strict” group consists of 13 states with an index of
7 or lower (Chart 1). Then the regression equations (3) and (4) pre-
sented in the last section are estimated for each group separately.
The regression estimates show that the stringency of balanced
budget rules has a strong bearing on asymmetry in state fiscal policy.
The patterns of asymmetries in revenue and expenditure differ sharply
across the tight rules and less strict rules groups. Moreover, the budget
surplus is significantly more asymmetric in states with less strict budget
rules than in states with tight rules.
In states with tight balanced budget rules, fiscal policy displays the
same pattern of asymmetries described in the last section for the full set
of states (Table 4). A rise in GSP has little effect on revenue and expen-
diture apart from a temporary increase in revenue, while both revenue
and expenditure decline markedly (with a lag) in downturns. As a
result, in states with tight rules the budget surplus displays only weak
Chart 1
STATES WITH TIGHT VS. LESS STRICT
BALANCED BUDGET RULES
Sources: NASBO and authors’ calculations
Tight
Less strict
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asymmetry over the business cycle. Thus, in states such as Missouri and
Colorado, fiscal policy provides nearly equal degrees of stabilization in
economic expansions and downturns.
States with less strict rules, however, follow very different fiscal poli-
cies, characterized by unique asymmetries in revenue and expenditure
and pronounced asymmetry in the budget surplus (Table 5). During
upturns, states with less strict balanced budget rules significantly
increase both revenue and expenditure, by much more than states with
tight rules. With revenue rising considerably more in states with less
strict rules, states with less strict rules experience a larger increase in the
budget surplus in the first few years of the upturn. During downturns,
both revenue and expenditure fall sharply for these states. Because rev-
enue falls by increasing amounts over time, the budget surplus contin-
ues to drop after its initial, substantial falloff.16 Thus, the budget
surplus displays more asymmetry in states with less strict budget rules.
In particular, in states with less strict budget rules, such as Massachu-
setts and New York, fiscal policy appears to mitigate economic slow-
downs more than it mutes booms.
Table 4
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO CHANGES IN GSP
States with Tight Balanced Budget Rules
Upturns Downturns
Years since rise in output Years since decline in output
012345 01234 5  
Dollar response to a Dollar response to a
$100 rise in GSP $100 decline in GSP
Revenue 3.5 2.8 3.1 2.4 1.3 .3 -4.9 -7.5 -5.9 -3.4 -6.8 -8.4
(7.0) (4.2) (3.9) (2.4) (1.1) (.2) (7.4) (8.8) (5.4) (3.0) (5.5) (6.2)
Expenditure -.1 -2.0 -.7 1.0 .2 -.2 -2.2 -1.8 -4.1 -3.7 -6.1 -6.6
( .1) (3.1) ( .9) (1.0) ( .2) ( .1) (3.5) (2.1) (4.0) (3.3) (5.1) (5.1)
Surplus 3.6 4.8 3.8 1.4 1.1 .5 -2.7 -5.7 -1.8 .3 -.7 -1.8 
Notes: Table 2 explains the calculation of the figures in the left side of the table. Table 3 explains the
calculation of the figures in the right side of the table.
Sources: DRI, BEA, NASBO, and authors’ calculations
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One interpretation of these findings is that states with less strict
rules accumulate larger surpluses in good times to finance deficit spend-
ing in downturns, while states with tight balanced budget restrictions
do not engage in as much deficit spending in downturns and thereby do
not need to accumulate savings in upturns.
Fiscal policy asymmetry and political conservatism
Because voters can change the balanced budget rules of states
through amendments to state constitutions, the stringency of a state’s
budget rules may reflect political attitudes within the state. States
which are more fiscally and politically conservative are more likely to
have tight balanced budget rules. 
As a result, the asymmetry in fiscal policy that appears to be associ-
ated with the stringency of these rules may instead reflect political dif-
ferences. For instance, as discussed above, states with tight balanced
budget rules accumulate less revenue during economic expansions than
states with less strict rules. But the driving force could be fiscal conser-
vatism, which is a consequence of more conservative political attitudes
in general. Conservative states may prefer not to have large rainy day
Table 5
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO CHANGES IN GSP
States with Less Strict Balanced Budget Rules
Upturns Downturns
Years since rise in output Years since decline in output
012345 01234 5  
Dollar response to a Dollar response to a
$100 rise in GSP $100 decline in GSP
Revenue 8.4 7.7 5.9 2.9 4.5 7.1 -7.8 -6.4 -5.9 -13.0 -15.9 -18.0
(8.0) (6.2) (3.9) (1.6) (2.5) (3.2) (6.6) (4.1) (3.2) (5.8) (6.3) (6.7)
Expenditure 2.1 -.7 2.2 3.6 3.4 5.4 -1.9 2.2 -1.4 -3.3 -4.9 -6.8
(2.2) (.7) (1.7) (2.6) (2.4) (3.2) (1.7) (1.6) (.8) (1.7) (2.2) (2.9)
Surplus 6.3 8.4 3.7 -.7 1.1 1.7 -5.9 -8.6 -4.5 -9.7 -11.0 -11.2
Notes: Table 2 explains the calculation of the figures in the left side of the table. Table 3 explains the
calculation of the figures in the right side of the table.
Sources: DRI, BEA, NASBO, and authors’ calculations
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funds and therefore not accumulate them. By the same token, in light
of their voters’ preferences, these states may also choose to have tight
balanced budget rules.
To examine the relationship between asymmetry and political con-
servatism, the states are again divided into two groups, “conservative’’
or “less conservative.” The division is based on the classification of states
developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver, who surveyed voters in all
states and recorded the percentage of voters declaring themselves con-
servative or liberal. These survey results are used to form a simple index
of conservatism—the percentage of voters declaring themselves conser-
vative minus the percentage of voters declaring themselves liberal.17
The groups of conservative and less conservative states include, respec-
tively, 13 and 35 states.18 The regression equations (3) and (4) presented
in the last section are estimated separately for each group.
The estimates suggest the fiscal behavior of state governments with
tighter balanced budget rules could indeed be the general result of polit-
ical conservatism instead of a direct outcome of balanced budget rules
(Tables 6 and 7). The regression estimates based on the conservative and
less conservative groups are virtually identical to those based on the tight
and less strict groups (Tables 4 and 5). During downturns, for example,
in states with either less strict budget rules or less conservative attitudes,
revenue initially falls sharply and then declines even further over time.
Ultimately, whether asymmetry in state fiscal policy is more a result
of balanced budget rules than the degree of conservatism cannot be
readily determined. There is considerable overlap in the tight rules and
conservative groups of states.19 For example, among the group of 13
conservative states, seven also have tight balanced budget rules. Such
overlap makes it hard to distinguish the roles of balanced budget rules
and conservatism in the asymmetry of state fiscal policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article examines the evidence of asymmetry in state fiscal policy
and the factors behind it. The article finds that state government budg-
ets display significant asymmetries over the business cycle. For example,
when state income rises, government revenue initially increases and then
reverts to its initial level, while expenditure remains roughly constant.
Sorensen.qxd  10/2/01  11:25 AM  Page 5758 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table 6
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO CHANGES IN GSP
States with Conservative Political Attitudes
Upturns Downturns
Years since rise in output Years since decline in output
012345 01234 5  
Dollar response to a Dollar response to a
$100 rise in GSP $100 decline in GSP
Revenue 3.4 2.6 2.8 2.0 1.0 .3 -4.6 -6.8 -5.2 -3.2 -6.5 -7.7
(6.8) (3.8) (3.4) (1.9) (.9) (.2) (6.9) (7.9) (4.8) (2.8) (5.2) (5.7)
Expenditure -.0 -1.6 -.8 .6 -.4 -.6 -1.4 -1.1 -3.5 -3.3 -5.9 -6.2
(.1) (2.7) (1.0) (.7) (.4) (.5) (2.3) (1.3) (3.6) (3.1) (5.1) (5.0)
Surplus 3.4 4.2 3.6 1.4 1.4 .9 -3.2 -5.7 -1.7 .1 -.6 -1.5
Notes: Table 2 explains the calculation of the figures in the left side of the table. Table 3 explains the
calculation of the figures in the right side of the table.
Sources: DRI; BEA; Erikson, Wright, and McIver; and authors’ calculations
Table 7
THE RESPONSE OF STATE BUDGETS TO CHANGES IN GSP
States with Less Conservative Political Attitudes
Upturns Downturns
Years since rise in output Years since decline in output
012345 01234 5  
Dollar response to a Dollar response to a
$100 rise in GSP $100 decline in GSP
Revenue 7.5 7.5 4.1 3.3 4.8 5.2 -9.9 -8.9 -6.5 -12.5 -14.9 -17.3
(6.7) (5.9) (2.7) (1.8) (2.5) (2.3) (7.3) (4.9) (2.9) (4.8) (5.2) (5.7)
Expenditure 2.9 -1.6 1.1 4.4 4.1 5.8 -4.7 .8 -1.8 -5.6 -6.6 -10.6
(2.8) (2.7) (.8) (3.0) (2.7) (3.2) (3.7) (.5) (.9) (2.5) (2.6) (3.8)
Surplus 4.6 10.3 3.0 -1.1 .7 -.6 -5.2 -8.1 -4.7 -6.9 -8.3 -6.7
Notes: Table 2 explains the calculation of the figures in the left side of the table. Table 3 explains the
calculation of the figures in the right side of the table.
Sources: DRI; BEA; Erikson, Wright, and McIver; and authors’ calculations
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But when state income falls, both revenue and expenditure decline, with
revenue remaining low for a sustained period. Such asymmetries appear
to be associated with balanced budget rules. However, because the asym-
metries also appear to be associated with conservatism, the fundamental
causes of the asymmetry cannot be precisely determined.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
In 1992, in the Dutch town of Maastricht, the members of the Euro-
pean Community agreed to impose a set of restrictions on government
budget deficits and the ratio of internal debt to GDP for countries wishing
to become members of the future European Monetary Union (EMU). In
essence, it was agreed that budget deficits would be kept below 3 percent
of GDP and the ratio of government debt to GDP would be capped at 60
percent. The accord, which became known as the Maastricht Treaty, has
been under heavy debate ever since its inception. In particular, observers
have questioned whether such restrictions on deficit spending are necessary
or optimal for maintaining fiscal discipline. Because these are hard ques-
tions to answer based on theoretical models, researchers—as is often the
case in debates relating to European unification—have looked to the expe-
riences of the members of one of the world’s most durable economic and
monetary unions, namely, the United States.20
Indeed, the fiscal restraints on EMU countries imposed by the Maas-
tricht Treaty are similar to the balanced budget rules that U.S. states face.
To the extent the asymmetry in state fiscal policy is believed to be due to
balanced budget rules, the results of this article have potentially important
implications for country members of the EMU. The results of this article
suggest restrictions of this type could limit the ability of EMU nations to
use fiscal policy to stabilize their economies during recessions. Such con-
straints may be of particular concern if the effectiveness of monetary policy
is asymmetric, with policy less effective at stimulating the economy than
slowing it. Studies have found such asymmetries in monetary policy for the
United States and for many other countries.21 Admittedly, however, this
article does not address the benefits balanced budget rules may yield by
preventing excessive deficits.
Even if asymmetries have been created by the Maastricht Treaty,
changing the restrictions would be difficult because the rules are imposed
by a multilateral agreement that took years to negotiate. These rules can-
not simply be changed unilaterally by a member of the EMU. Therefore,
such budget restrictions could affect Europe differently than the United
States, where the balanced budget rules that state governments face are
self-imposed. The U.S. rules are part of state constitutions and, therefore,
hard to change, but they could be adjusted unilaterally by the voters of a
state if sentiments were strong enough.
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ENDNOTES
1 Using methods developed by Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha in 1996,
Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha find that state and local government fiscal policy
smoothes fluctuations in the disposable income of state residents. However, state
and local fiscal policy provides less income smoothing than federal fiscal policy.
2 State governments also (partly) control the revenue of insurance trust funds,
utilities, and liquor stores.
In general, trust funds, utilities, and liquor stores are excluded because they
are “off-budget.” State governments may be tempted to off-load fiscal burdens to
insurance trust funds, utilities, and liquor stores in downturns in order to balance
the general fund. To some extent state governments are also able to off-load fiscal
burdens to local governments. Although there are examples of states engaging in
such burden shifting, on average such shifting does not seem to be important
enough to significantly affect the business cycle behavior of budgets. Sorensen,
Wu, and Yosha find that the budgets of local governments, utilities, and pension
funds all tend to move together, with the state government budget being the most
cyclical, and their results indicate that state governments do not systematically use
“off-budget” accounts to circumvent balanced budget rules.
3 In addition, regressions are performed in a two-step procedure to allow for
separate error variances for each state and year and for first order autocorrelation in
the residual (assuming the same autoregressive coefficient for each state).
4 Data on state revenue and expenditure were obtained from the Data
Resources Inc. (DRI) database. GSP and population data were obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
5 These qualitative patterns are robust to the number of lags that are included
in the regressions.
6 These numbers are obtained by subtracting the second from the third row
(therefore, t-statistics are not displayed). Alternatively, the reaction of the surplus
to GSP fluctuations could be estimated directly from regressions of the state
budget surplus—the level of the surplus, not the change—on changes in GSP . In
such a regression, the level of the surplus would be used because, unlike revenue
and expenditure, the surplus does not change permanently in response to changes in
GSP . The results from estimating this regression would, however, be qualitatively
the same as those displayed in Table 1.
7 Gramlich obtains somewhat different results using national data on state
and local government budgets for the period 1955-90. He finds that the ratio of
government spending to GNP is affected positively by the national unemployment
rate, whereas the results in Table 1 indicate that spending is affected positively
when GSP rises. The results do not point in the same direction, but need not be
regarded as contradictory since there is no year-by-year correspondence between
GSP changes and the unemployment rate. Gramlich further finds that taxes are
affected negatively by the lagged unemployment rate, which is consistent with this
article’s finding that government revenue rises with GDP .
8 Of related interest are Poterba’s (1994) study of the fiscal response of state
governments to fiscal “surprises” (shocks) and Gavin and Perotti’s analysis of the
cyclical patterns of fiscal policy in Latin American countries. Other related studies
include Drazen; Wagner; Fatas and Mihov; Poterba and von Hagen; Lane;
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Arreaza, Sorensen, and Yosha; Sorensen and Yosha (1999, 1998); Bohn; Talvi and
Vegh; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen; Bohn and Inman; von Hagen and Eichen-
green; and Goodhart and Smith.
9 Poterba and Reuben find that large state government deficits are associated
with higher interest rates on state government bonds. 
10 A few states, such as Missouri, have constitutional amendments that limit
the growth in state revenue relative to personal income.
11 Such behavior during upswings justifies the reluctance of markets to lend to
governments during recessions.
12 The model of Persson, Persson, and Svensson was not explicitly formulated
for the purpose of explaining asymmetric spending.
13 For comprehensive discussions of “political business cycles,” see Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen; and Drazen.
14 Formally, Table 3 reports the negative of the b--coefficients from regression
equations (3) and (4).
15 Table 2 may leave the impression that state government expenditure and
revenue will ratchet down over time. This is true, but only relative to the upward
trend in these components: on average state government revenue was about 7 per-
cent of GSP in the 1960s and about 12 percent of GSP in the 1990s.
16 Because the results in Table 5 relate only to the deviations from the state
average growth rates of the fiscal variables, the results have no implications for
whether budget deficits are sustainable or not.
17 Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha found that conservative states display less procycli-
cal surpluses than liberal states. However, they did not find any difference in the
cyclicality of budget surpluses between “republican” and “democratic” states (simi-
larly defined). Thus, the results for more or less conservative states should not be
identified with results for states with an affinity for any particular political party. 
18 Accordingly, the sizes of the conservative and less conservative groups
match the sizes of the tight and less strict balanced budget rule groups. Classifying
the states into 24 conservative and 24 less conservative states produced very simi-
lar results.
19 The correlation between the two indices is 0.4.
20 See, for example, von Hagen and Eichengreen.
21 See Cover; and Morgan for evidence regarding the United States, and Kar-
ras for results for European countries.
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